We examine the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) and firm value and how this relationship is moderated by ownership concentration using a sample of 379 listed family and 151 non-family firms for the period 2007 to 2009. Ordinary Least Square Pooled Model as well as Fixed Effects Model panel data regressions are used in the data analysis. For family firms, we find that RPTs reduce firm value (proxied by Tobin's Q and market-to-book value). Further, controlling shareholders' ownership has a significant positive moderating effect on this relationship. However, for non-family firms, there is no significant evidence of firm value reduction and positive moderating effect respectively. We conclude that expropriation via RPTs is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. Additionally, an increase in controlling shareholders' ownership helps mitigate this expropriation and this mitigating effect is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. The implications for the capital market regulator are discussed in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
Generally, extant corporate governance literature focuses on the traditional shareholdermanager Agency Problem Type I -principal-agent problem (De Cesari, 2012) , prevalent in widely held firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . However, in firms controlled by one or more shareholders with large stakes (controlling firms), corporate insiders possess incentives to pursue private benefits at the expense of outsider shareholders, resulting in minority shareholder expropriation (De Cesari, 2012) , known as Agency Problem Type II -principal-principal problem, particularly prevalent in the emerging markets (Ahlstrom et al., 2010) . In these circumstances, family controlling shareholders assume control of most businesses and are the incentivized to expropriate minority shareholders (Cueto, 2013) . However, reputational effects can mitigate this expropriation problem (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) . In emerging markets, these effects are deemed as poor substitutes for institutional deficiencies (Peng and Jiang, 2010) because even firms with good reputation exploit minority shareholders particularly during periods of financial crisis (Johnson et al., 2000) .
Nevertheless, this line of reasoning is unconvincing in the context of corporate fiascos such as the Transmile case in Malaysia 1 . These scandals resulted in strong remedial action by the regulators post 2007. We believe, the reputational effect plays a significant role on corporate governance of family firms. For that reason, we question whether reputational effect is a poor substitute for institutional deficiencies.
There is still limited evidence on minority shareholder expropriation and Agency Problem Type II (Bjuggren et al., 2011) particularly in emerging markets. Most expropriation studies show the existence of expropriation but they offer very little empirical evidence on how expropriation is conducted (Jiang et al., 2010) .
Furthermore, there is limited evidence on the role of controlling shareholders' ownership on the relationship between expropriation and firm value (Ahrens et al., 2011) . We investigate whether controlling shareholders' ownership concentration moderates the relationship between RPTs that are likely to result in expropriation and firm value. Prior studies investigated the moderating role of other internal corporate governance mechanisms on this relationship, but evidence on ownership concentration role is limited.
Therefore, this study investigates whether RPTs in Malaysia affect firm value and whether controlling shareholders' ownership moderates this relationship. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the corporate governance institutional context in Malaysia, evaluates the extant corporate governance literature and develops the relevant hypotheses; Section 3 explains the research methodology; Section 4 discusses the findings and finally Section 5 discusses the implications of the findings. Section 6 concludes.
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING, LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Malaysian Institutional Setting: Corporate Governance Development and Regulatory Framework
A major post-1997 Asian financial crisis corporate governance reform in Malaysia was the introduction of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2000. This Code was revised in 2007 and 2012. MCCG is considered largely ineffective in reducing minority shareholder expropriation due its voluntary nature of adoption (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009 ). Intuitively, controlling shareholders in Malaysia may take this opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders, even though, they are still required to state in their annual reports the extent of their compliance, with an explanation for any departure (Securities Commission, 2012) . One of the ways controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders is through RPTs.
Hypotheses Development
RPTs, Expropriation and Firm Value
RPTs are diverse complex business transactions between a company and its management or owners (Gordon et al., 2004) . Cheung et.al (2006) identify RPTs that are likely to result in expropriation as asset acquisitions, asset sales, equity sales, trading relationships and cash payments made to a related party.
Although there are benefits of RPTs such as communication and contracting efficiencies as well as reduction in holdup problems (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2007) , these transactions are more likely to result in negative effects on firm value because they are perceived as mechanisms for controlling shareholders to extract resources from their firms through tunnelling (Djankov et al., 2008) . Two main institutional factors in Malaysia, which incentivize expropriation by controlling shareholders through RPTs are: (i) Malaysia's political economy that encourages rent seeking, creating huge resources for controlling shareholders to expropriate via RPTs (Searle, 1999); (ii) regulatory loopholes 2 encourages expropriation through these channels (Thillainathan, 1999) . The negative effects of RPTs are arguably more severe and prevalent in family firms, where family members are involved in the management, compared to non-family firms. Plausibly family controlling shareholders possess incentives to enhance the interests of their family members through related sales, related lending, loan guarantees and related borrowings (Yeh et al., 2012) . Hence, the following hypotheses are developed: H1: There is a negative relationship between RPTs that are likely to result in expropriation and firm value among Malaysian firms. H2: The negative relationship between RPTs that are likely to result in expropriation and firm value among Malaysian firms will be stronger in family compared to non-family firms.
Moderating Effects of the Controlling Shareholder's Ownership Concentration, Expropriation and Firm Value
The role of ownership concentration on expropriation is important, particularly, in emerging markets, due to the prevalence of high ownership concentration in these markets (Morck and Yeung, 2003) . In the Malaysian institutional and corporate governance context, arguably post-Transmile, reputational concerns may play a role in positively moderating family controlling shareholders' ownership impact on expropriation. Reputational concerns are prevalent amongst family owners of large family firms with high equity stakes. These family owners are most likely cognizant of their reputational effect post-Transmile. Transmile is a large family-owned Malaysian corporation that attracted significant negative publicity and led to several amendments to the MCCG in 2007.
Arguably, the reputational effect works as follows: As the family owners' shareholding increases, they have greater incentives to ensure their reputational capital by reducing minority shareholder expropriation (Loy, 2010) . Thus, reputational effect aligns the family owners' interests to those of minority shareholders, thus, reducing Agency Problem Type II. Ultimately, this induces a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders' ownership on the impact of controlling shareholders' expropriation on firm value. Hence, the following hypotheses arise: H3: There is a positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder's ownership concentration on the relationship between RPTs and firm value, among Malaysian firms. H4: The positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder's ownership concentration on the relationship between RPTs and firm value among Malaysian firms is stronger in family compared to non-family firms.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research Design
Sample
Secondary data related to the types of ultimate owner, financial information and board statistics is used for the period 2007-2009. These period is chosen because family firm reputational effect may be intensified post-Transmile case in 2006. The data is obtained from companies' annual reports or from Bloomberg database. A total of 379 public-listed family firms are analysed. We define family firms as firms controlled by individuals or families with at least 20% voting rights (Chakrabarty, 2009) as well with at least a family member holding a managerial position (i.e. board member, CEO or chairman, chairman of the syndicate pact) (Cascino et al., 2010) . Additionally, a total of 151 public-listed nonfamily firms are analysed. Table 1 explains the proxies used to measure the dependent variables. This is extracted from the data of the substantial shareholding in the annual report. It is measured in terms of percentage of total equity held by the largest shareholder (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . In the context of Malaysian annual reports, the substantial shareholding is calculated by summating the direct and indirect shareholding of the largest shareholder.
Variables Definition and Measurement
Control Variables
In line with prior corporate governance literature, we control for twelve variables, namely, Qit or MBVit or ROEit or ROAit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(OC)it + β3(SIZE)it + β4(RISK)it + β5(LEV)it + β6(IDR)it + β7(NAB)it + β8(AGE)it + β9(SG)it + β10(RDS)it + β11(CS)it + β12(MS)it + β13(GDP)it + β14(OC)it(RPT)it + µit Pooled Model (Family and Non-Family Firms)
2.
Qit or MBVit or ROEit or ROAit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(OC)it + β3(SIZE)it + β4(RISK)it + β5(LEV)it + β6(IDR)it + β7(NAB)it + β8(AGE)it + β9(SG)it + β10(RDS)it + β11(CS)it + β12(MS)it + β13(GDP)it + β14(OC)it(RPT)it + β15FTit + µit Tables 3 and 4 present the summary statistics of the continuous variables of the family firm and non-family samples respectively. It can be seen that the average RPTs differs.
Endogeneity Test
We performed the Hausman Specification Test (Hausman, 1978) to investigate whether endogeneity exists in that ownership maybe determined by firm value (Andres, 2008 ). An instrumental variable (IV) (Gujarati and Porter, 2009), the predicted value of ownership concentration, obtained by regressing the original ownership concentration values against firm size, the square of firm size and firm risk (Himmelberg et al., 1999) provided a control for endogeneity problem.
Research Results
For family firms, the regression results for the normal pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effect Model (FEM) show that RPTs that are likely to result in expropriation significantly reduce firm value (Tobin's Q and MBV) at 1% and 5% significance level. When ownership concentration moderates the relationship between RPTs and firm value, the firm value (Tobin's Q and MBV) effects turns positive. This is significant at 5% significance level. In the case of non-family firms, the regression results for the normal pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effect Model (FEM) show that RPTs that are likely to result in expropriation do not have a significant relationship with firm value. Additionally, ownership concentration has no significant moderating effect on the relationship between RPTs and the firm value (market and accounting-based performance measures). Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the results for the pooled model of family and nonfamily firms. Tables 5.1 and 5 .2, family firms possess a lower firm value (Tobin's Q and MBV) compared with non-family firms. This is significant at 1% significance level. In addition, in the pooled model (family and non-family firms), the joint hypotheses of H0: βRPTs of family firms and βRPTs of non-family firms = 0 is rejected and has a significant negative relationship with firm value (Tobin's Q and MBV). This is significant at 5% and 10% significance level. Both these results coupled with the significant negative relationship between RPTs and firm value (Tobin's Q and MBV) in the family firm regression results indicate that the negative relationship between RPTs and firm value (Tobin's Q and MBV) is stronger in family firms compared to nonfamily firms. This is because the resulting lower firm value (Tobin's Q and MBV) of family firms in the pooled model (family and non-family firms) regression results is contributed by the significant negative relationship between RPTs and firm value (Tobin's Q and MBV). Likewise, for the joint hypotheses of H0 : βOC x RPTs of family firms and βOC x RPTs of non-family firms = 0, it can also be concluded that the significant positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders' ownership on the relationship between RPTs and firm value (Tobin's Q and MBV) is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. The overall lower firm value (Tobin's Q and MBV) of family firms in the pooled model (family and non-family firms) indicates a stronger corporate reputational effects in family firms.
Additionally, we found that the main research results for family firms and nonfamily firms (i.e. the effect of RPTs on firm value and the moderating effect of ownership concentration on this relationship) are robust against industry effects. The significant results are also restricted to Tobin's Q and MBV.
IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
Overall, we observe that expropriation through RPTs occurs among Malaysian firms which reduces firm value. All hypotheses are supported but only when firm value is proxied by market-based performance measures. Expropriation via RPTs (which reduce Tobin's Q and MBV) is stronger in family compared to non-family firms within the Malaysian institutional setting. Moreover, there is a significant positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders' ownership on the relationship between RPTs and firm value among Malaysian firms.
.
CONCLUSIONS
We show that minority shareholder expropriation through RPTs exists amongst Malaysian firms. Interestingly, we evidence that family firm reputational effect plays a role in reducing minority shareholder expropriation in Malaysian family firms, particularly, in the post-Transmile era. A new dimension to agency theory emerges -corporate reputational effect. Our finding contradicts Peng and Jiang (2010)'s observation that reputational effects is a poor substitute for institutional deficiencies in emerging markets. On the policy front, we suggest the Securities Commission in Malaysia (SCM) take note that minority shareholder expropriation exists amongst Malaysian public-listed firms. Further, mitigation efforts by SCM on minority shareholder expropriation problems through RPTs ought to focus on family rather than non-family firms and that SCM re-evaluate Part 8, Para. 8.1-8.3 of the MCCG 2012 to ensure adequate protection of minority shareholder rights. Lastly, future research could consider analysing the effects of legislation on minority shareholder expropriation particularly in emerging markets. 
